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Patterns of Legal Change:
Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies
Katharina Pistor1
EBRD Working Paper Nr. 49/2000
Forthcoming in the European Business Organisation Law Review Vol. 1 Nr. 1 (2000)
1. Introduction
The reform of the enterprise sector in the former socialist countries has been at the core of the
economic reform programs, which were launched ten years ago, beginning in Poland and followed
by other governments throughout the region. A key element of the enterprise reform package was
privatisation. Depending on the country and the specific area of the law in question, this reform
measure was preceded, accompanied, or followed by legal reforms. Legal reforms in the region
have been comprehensive and affected not only areas immediately relevant for the enterprise
sector, but the entire legal system ranging from constitutional, administrative, criminal and civil
                                                
1 Assistant Professor for Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The paper was
completed during my stay at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law Hamburg, which
generously contributed its resources without which this study would not have been feasible. Financial support by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is gratefully acknowledged . Violetta Bessenich,
Sorniza Dimitrova, and Dmitri Gavriline provided excellent research assistance.  I would like to thank Klaus J. Hopt
for helpful comments and suggestions in developing the framework for this analysis. Helpful comments were also
received from participants at seminars at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law in Hamburg, the
Stockholm Institute for Transition Economies (SITE), and the Institute for East European Law at the University of
Vienna.
2
law to the organisation and procedural rules of the court system.2 This paper focuses on laws that
are immediately relevant for the restructuring and financing of enterprises, in particular the rights
of shareholders as stipulated in company laws, securities regulations, and the right of creditors as
holders of collateral and in bankruptcy. The paper investigates the patterns of legal change in
these areas of the law and to identifies key determinants of legal change. The method employed is
a formalised comparison of legal change based on pre-defined legal indicators. A data base was
constructed, which codes the development of shareholder and creditor rights from 1990 through
1998 for 24 transition economies (excluding only Serbia, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan).  The
paper joins a growing literature that uses cross-country formalised legal indicators to investigate
the interaction between legal and economic change using statistical tools.3 It introduces the data
used and descriptively analyses the patterns of legal change that can be observed. A statistical
analysis of the interaction between legal and economic change is addressed in a separate paper.4
The results presented in this paper can be summarised as follows: Despite substantial differences
in the initial conditions across countries, there is a strong tendency towards convergence of formal
legal rules as the result of extensive legal reforms. Convergence seems to be primarily the result of
foreign technical assistance programs as well as of harmonisation requirements for countries
wishing to join the European Union. The external supply of legal rules not withstanding, the
pattern of legal reforms suggests that law reform has been primarily responsive to economic
change rather than initiating or leading it. In comparison, the pre-socialist heritage of transition
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Evolving Legal Framework for Private Sector Development in Central and Eastern Europe,  (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank 1993). Sachs, and Pistor, Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia,  (Boulder, Co.: Westview
Press 1997).
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3
economies has little explanatory power for the observed patterns of legal change. Partial
exceptions are countries with German legal heritage, which favour creditor over shareholder
protection and displayed substantially better creditor protection at the outset of reforms than
other transition economies.
2. Convergence and Divergence in Legal Development
The literature of the new institutional economics (NIE) defines institutions as “any form of
constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction”5, which includes both the formal
law and informal constraints, or social norms. A question raised in this literature, which shall also
be addressed in this paper, is how institutions change over time. Two competing hypotheses
address the dynamics of institutional change. The first hypothesis suggests that competition will
over time self-select the most effective institutions and different social systems will converge on
these.6 The second hypothesis proposes that institutions develop along path dependent
trajectories. Institutional change is incremental and shaped by pre-existing conditions. Thus,
systems will continue to diverge rather than converge, even in the presence of competition.7 In
light of the increasing integration of markets, some authors suggest that while specific institutions
may remain different, the globalisation of the economy will lead to functional convergence through
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, “Law and Finance in Transition Economies,” mimeo: EBRD  (1999).
5 North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1st ed. ed.  (New York: Norton 1981). at p. 4.
6 Easterbrook, and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press 1991). The convergence hypothesis has been most prevalent among macro economists. They show strong
trends towards convergence in levels of GDP per capita among regions within the US. See , strong convergence of
OECD countries Dorwick, and Nguyen, “OECD Comparative Economic Growth 1950-1985,” AER 79.5 (1989):
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substitution effects.8 Thus, a third hypothesis could be added, namely that different institutional
arrangements may be used for similar functions. The variance in institutions may be the result of
different initial conditions, but the tasks they perform are largely the same.
There is a lively debate in the corporate governance literature about these alternative patterns of
institutional development and in particular about the role of law for convergence or divergence of
corporate governance systems. Proponents of the divergence, or path dependence, hypothesis
argue that even if the corporate law was harmonised across countries, other legal rules (tax laws,
codetermination legislation etc.) and institutional constraints (financial structure, existing
ownership structure of firms), or simply political considerations would stand in the way of
convergence.9 The opposite view holds that convergence is likely to take place, once the main
regulatory obstacles are removed.10 The economic forces towards success, they suggest, are the
same all over the world. Both views regard legal institutions as important for promoting or
hindering convergence, but differ in their assessment of the propensity of a particular body of
law, such as corporate law, to achieve this goal.
The literature up to now has used qualitative analysis as a method to investigate these questions.
This paper, by contrast, proposes a way to test the competing hypotheses this literature has
developed in a more rigorous way by systematically coding legal rules in time series. In this
                                                
8 Coffee, “The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications,” NW Univ L Rev. 93.2 (1999): 631-707. For a similar point based on a case study of recent trends in
German corporate governance see Gordon, “Corporate Governance: Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps
on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany,” Colum J Eur L 3.Spring (1999): 219.. However, he correctly
points out that political constraints, as well as long-term practices of insider governance may limit the scope of
convergence. See ibid at p. 241.
9 Roe (1996) n 7; Bebchuk, and Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership,”
Stanf. L Rev. 52.November (1999): 127.. See also Gordon supra n 8.
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regard, the paper also deviates from La Porta et al. (1998), who code legal rules at a single point in
time – the early nineties – and boldly assume that law does not change dramatically over time.11
The paper focuses on the development of legal change in transition economies and documents
change in the law on the books. There are several reasons for mapping out the details of change in
the law on the books. First, some authors have argued that even though corporate law may be
trivial in developed market economies,12 it is likely to play a much greater role in transition
economies where it not only redefines the allocation of rights and responsibilities of various
stakeholders, but also serves an educational function.13 Second, new research results stress the
importance of legal rules as determinants for corporate finance and corporate governance. In a
survey of corporate governance around the world, Shleifer and Vishny  argue that the structure of
firms and the level of stock market development is determined by the quality of shareholder
protection.14 In countries with strong shareholder protection, investors can afford to take
minority positions rather than controlling stakes. As a result, firms tend to have dispersed
shareholders as owners, and capital markets are rather liquid. By contrast, where shareholder
rights are not well protected, investors will compensate this deficiency by taking controlling
stakes. This leads to high levels of ownership concentration. Regression analyses using indicators
for the quality of the law on the books in 49 countries around the world (excluding transition
economies) on the one hand, and ownership concentration of the largest listed companies as well
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Easterbrook, and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press 1991). Ramseyer, “The A-Contextual Logic to the Japanese Keiretsu,” Corporate Governance Today, ed. Roe,
(New York City: offset  1998): 527-563.
11 See La Porta et al. (1998) n. 3 at p. 1126.
12 Black, “Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,” NW Univ L Rev. 84 (1990): 542-597..
The argument holds that efficient capital markets, well functioning and competitive managerial labour, and product
markets, are effective constraints on managerial power than formal legal constraints.
13 Black, and Kraakman, “A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,” HLR 109 (1996): 1911-1982. Hay, Shleifer,
and Vishny, “Toward a Theory of Legal Reform,” EER 40.3-5 (1996): 559-567.
14 Shleifer, and Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” The Journal of Finance LII.2 (1997): 737-783.
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as key indicators for stock market development on the other, confirm that high quality law on the
books — as measured by the legal indicators used in this study — is positively correlated with
(relatively) dispersed ownership and liquid capital markets.15 Similarly, Levine shows that high
quality creditor protection law is important for bank performance as measured by the volume of
credit to the private sector.16
Third, a detailed analysis of change in the law on the books will enhance our understanding of the
interaction between legal and economic change. Law is frequently treated as exogenous to socio-
economic change, because many countries received their formal legal order from other countries by
way of transplantation.17 In the most simplistic scenario of the convergence theory, identical legal
rules should lead to largely similar outcomes. However, even when law is transplanted, the law
does not necessarily precede the development of a country's enterprise or financial sector.
Structural differences in the ownership concentration of firms, the existence or absence of stock
markets, the quality of the banking sector, and the extent to which the state controls the real
and/or the financial sector either directly as an owner, or indirectly through regulation and case by
case interventions, may have created conditions that put countries on different development
paths, which are not easily broken by changing the laws on the books.18
The problem of pre-existing conditions is of particular relevance in transition economies. They
inherited an enterprise sector from the socialist regime, which was in need of restructuring.
                                                
15 La Porta et al. (1998) n. 3; La Porta et al. (1997) ibid. The authors of these studies also mention the importance
of effective enforcement institutions. Yet, even if these variables are controlled for, the contents of legal rules and
their origin seems to matter.
16 Levine (1998) n. 3.
17 La Porta et al. (1998) n. 3.
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Although the development of a new enterprise sector is important, the main challenge at least in
the initial stages of economic transition was to devise a legal system that would help meet the
financial needs of the existing enterprises and facilitate their restructuring. Privatisation strategies
may have created another path dependence, as they determined the initial ownership structure of
firms. Mass privatisation programs tended to promote relatively more dispersed ownership
structures and/or large fractions of insider ownership, whereas direct sales methods led to block
holdings by strategic investors.19 In addition, the legacy of the socialist system meant that most
countries were saddled with banks that carried bad loan portfolios and lacked the capacity to
assess and monitor the viability of investment projects they were financing.20 Whether these
initial conditions or the quality of laws can explain the outcomes we observe today, such as the
extent of enterprise restructuring, the level of development of the financial sector, or the
effectiveness of corporate governance, can be assessed only once we know the pattern of legal
change.
Path dependence is relevant not only for economic development, but also for the development of
the legal system. An important finding of La Porta et al. is that countries, which became part of
the same legal family in the nineteenth century display remarkably similar features in the quality
of investor protection even today.21 Transition economies were also not barren countries with
                                                                                                                                                             
18 Bebchuk (1999) n 9; Bebchuk, “A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,” NBER Working
Paper Series 7203 (1999). Pistor, “Law as a Determinant for Stockmarket Development in Eastern Europe,” The
Value of Law in Transition Economies, ed. Murrell, (Washington, D.C.:  1999): (forthcoming).
19 Despite these differences in initial conditions, commentators agree that transition economies are increasingly
converging on a control structure with concentrated ownership rather than sustaining dispersed ownership. See
Berglöf, “Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: TheTheory and Its Policy Implications,” Corporate
Governance in Transitional Economies, ed. Aoki, and Kim, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank  1995): 59-98.
with data for the largest companies in three transition economies. For a theoretical explanation of the instability of
noncontrol structures, see Bebchuk (1999) n. 18.
20 Brainard, “Reform in Eastern Europe: Creating a Capital Market,” Ec Rev.  (1991): 49-58. EBRD, Transition
Report,  (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 1998).
21 La Porta et al. (1998) n. 3.
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respect to their legal development. Many of the Central and Eastern European countries still had
their prewar codes on the books. They were often riddled with socialist principles, but still
contained key provisions on shareholder and creditor rights. Most of these countries can trace
their formal legal systems back to either to the German or the French civil law family.22 Following
the logic of the path dependence hypothesis, one might expect that they will now borrow again
from countries that belong to the same legal family, rather than looking for more effective rules
elswhere.23
In addition, the socialist system itself, including the early trasition to a market economy may have
created new path dependencies. Many transition economies had started to introduce legal change
prior to the collapse of the socialist system.24 Hungary was the first country to introduce a
bankruptcy code in 1986 and promulgated a law on business associations in 1988. The Soviet
Union also enageged in extensive legal reforms during the period of perestroika, which has shaped
the post-socialist legal system.25 A law on enterprises was adopted in 1987 and decrees on joint
stock companies were issued at the Union level as well as in Russia in 1990. Many of these laws
had serious gaps. Moreover, as these laws were adopted when the socialist doctrine still shaped
the basic understanding and design of law, they frequently intorduced hybrid legal constructs,
                                                
22 Many of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe modeled their legal systems in the interwar period on the
German system. In the countries of Southeastern Europe that used to be part of the Ottoman empire, French law had
stronger influence, mostly because of the reception of French law in the 19th century when the Ottoman empire
reformed its legal system. Nevertherless, the borrowing does not suggest that the model was followed closely, or
other legal systems were not consulted in the process. A brief summary of the history of the formal private law in
different countries can be found in Knapp, ed., National Reports, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1972) 1. For a summary
of the socialist legal system see Zweigert, and Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiet des
Privatrechts,  (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck 1984). pp. 332-403. This legal family has now been dropped.
See Zweigert, and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3 ed.  (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998).
23There is, of course, a lively debate about the relevance of legal families. The area of the law for which the legal
families has been developed is the core of the civil law, i.e. contract law, property rights, and torts. Constitutional
and administrative law development usually does not follow the same pattern. Even for other areas of private law,
including corporate law and capital market development, is doubtful, whether a consisten set of criteria exists that
makes the distinction of different legal families meaningful.
24 Pistor (1995) n. 2.
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which created obstacles for market based legal reforms in the post-socialist era. This is true in
particular in the area of property rights. A good example is the concept of operative management,
which allocates full control over assets to a company without transfering ownership. The
separation between ownership and control leaves management unaccountable to the owner and
fails to allocate liabilities of the enterprise.26
Thus, pre-war history, late socialist reforms, as well as the policy choices at the outset of the
transition process may have constrained policy makers and legislators in designing a new legal
system. And yet, the political and economic regime change they initiated could have given them
the opportunity to design the law on the books in a way they deemed most appropriate for future
development. Because of the relative ease with which laws can be enacted in comparison to the
difficulties of restructuring the enterpise or financial sectors (prolonged political struggles in the
parliament notwithstanding) this is the area, where policy design shoud be most apparent. This
scenario assumes that policy makers are fully aware of the possible implications of alternative
institutional design, and are free to choose among them. The actual experience of transition shows,
that his is a rather bold assumption. Case study analyses of institutional reform in transition
economies show that the selection and implementation of reform measures was more erratic, with
frequently several reform avenues pursued simultaneously.27
In order to analyse the determinants of legal change in transition economies, we have constructed a
data base that codes shareholder and creditor rights in 24 transition economies from 1990 through
                                                                                                                                                             
25 Butler, Soviet Law , 2 ed.  (London: Butterworths 1988). Feldbrugge, Russian Law: The End of the Soviet System
and the Role of Law,  (Dordrecht, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993)..
26See Feldbrugge (1993) n 25 footnote 25 pp. 236-239 for details.
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1998. We capture annual change with the year-end status being used for coding purposes. The
coding includes, but extends the indicators selected by La Porta et al.28 The primary purpose of
this extension is to capture possible functional substitutes different legal systems offer for
shareholder or creditor protection. We will discuss the additional variables as well as the
cumulative indices we constructed using these variables in sections 3 and 4 below.29 The original
indicators are, however, sufficient for a first test of the convergence or divergence hypotheses in
legal development. They also enable us to compare emerging patterns in transition economies with
those found in other countries.
We refer to the cumulative shareholder rights index (called antidirectors index by La Porta et al.) as
LLSVsh, and to the cumulative creditors rights index as LLSVcr.  LLSVsh is composed of 6
variables, which reflect the position of minority shareholders in firms and code provisions that
protect them on the one hand, as well as the absence of provisions that weaken their position, on
the other. The index includes (1) proxy voting by mail; (2) shareholders are not required by law to
deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders‘ meeting; (3) cumulative voting, or
proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is ensured by other means; (4)
an oppressed minorities mechanism, defined as the ability of shareholders to sue directors or to
challenge the decisions of shareholder meetings in court is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of
share capital that entitles a shareholder to call an extraordinary shareholders‘ meeting is less than
or equal to 10 percent; and (6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights when new shares are issued
that can be waived only by a shareholder vote.
                                                                                                                                                             
27 See Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea,
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1998). for the pattern of institutional change in Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia.
28 La Porta et al. (1998) n. 3.
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LLSVcr includes four variables, all of which address the role of creditors, and in particular secured
creditors, in bankruptcy procedure: (1) restrictions such as creditor consent exist for going into
reorganization as opposed to liquidation; (2) secured creditors are not stayed in bankruptcy; (3)
secured assets are satisfied first when assets are distributed; and (4), management does not stay in
bankruptcy, but is replaced with a court or creditor appointed receiver.
The convergence hypothesis as applied to legal change predicts that countries select the legal rules
that have shown to be most effective in other countries, and regulatory competition leads to the
harmonisation of legal rules. By contrast, the divergence hypothesis proposes that the choices
lawmakers face are constrained by pre-existing institutions, political and social forces. Transition
economies may have been caught in this pattern of path dependent development, or they may
have taken the opportunity of a regime change to fundamentally alter their inherited legal systems
by choosing legal rules that have shown to be most effective in competitive institutional
evolution. To test these two propositions, we determine the level of shareholder and creditor
protection in transition economies at the outset of the transition period. Rather than 1990, we
chose 1992, because of variations in the onset of the regime change, and because we lack early data
for some countries.
Using the pre-socialist legal heritage as a basis, we can distinguish three groups of countries
moving from West to East. First, the countries with a German legal heritage. They received their
formal legal systems either from Austria, because they belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian empire
                                                                                                                                                             
29 Details for the definition of variables and their coding are given in Appendix 1.
12
prior to its dissolution, or copied the law from Germany in the interwar period. The countries
that belong to this family include most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Baltics, namely Croatia, the Czech Repbulic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the
Slovak Repbulic, and Slovenia (hereinafter CEE/Baltics).30 The second group are countries that
used to belong to the Ottoman empire and received French law, when its legal system underwent
modernization in the mid 19th century.31 These countries include Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, the
Federal Republic of Macedonia, and Romania, i.e. the countries of South-Eastern Europe
(hereinafter SEE). The final group is comprised of the former Soviet Union Republics with the
exception of the Baltic states. Their legal history is quite diverse. Russia was influenced by
Roman/Byzantine law and reforms in the late 19th and early 20th century were modeled primarily
on German law.32 The central Asian republics were governed by Islamic law and various
customary rules. What they have in common is the absence of a firmly established modern formal
legal order prior to the emergence of the socialist system. Table 1 below lists the level of
shareholder and creditor rights in the the three regions in 1992 and 1998 and compares it with the
the level of protection in the four major legal families reported by.33
                                                
30Part of Poland, of course, received French law during the Napoleonic wars. However, subsequently German law has
been stronger.
31 Note that periodically Bosnia belonged to the Austro-Hungarian empire, but this has not strongly affected its legal
development during the 19 th century.
32 Owen, The Corporation under Russian Law, 1800-1917,  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1991).
Knapp, ed., National Reports, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1972) 1.
33 La Porta et al. (1998) n. 3.
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Table 1: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in comparison with legal families and world average
Shareholder Rights Creditor Rights
1992 1998 1992 1998
CEE/Baltics 2 3.05 2.55 3.55
SEE 2 2.6 0 3
Eurasia 2.35 3.45 1.05 3.05
All Transition Economies 2,17 3,13 1,40 3,23
Common law 4.0 3.11
French civil law 2.33 1.58
German civil law 2.33 2.33
Scandinavian civil law 3.0 2.0
Wolrd Average (49 countries) 3.0 2.30
Source: La Porta (1998) n. 3 and compilation by author.
At the outset of legal reforms, the level of shareholder and creditor protection in all transition
economies was well below world average. In the breakdown by legal families, the only exception
is the level of creditor rights protection in TEs of German legal origin. They are above world
average, and even higher than the Germany family average. By 1998, legal changes had been
introduced that raised the level of investor protection in most transition economies above the level
of the civil law systems and brought them within close range of the average for common law
countries, which offers the best protection for investors according to La Porta et al..34
The fact that transition economies of French origin continue to lag behind most other transition
economies in 1998, can be attributed largely to the late onset of reforms in the countries that used
to belong to Yugoslavia, where war and civil unrest delayed economic as well as legal reforms.35
Still, changes in creditor rights have been remarkable in these countries. An interesting feature of
the Eurasian countries is that their performance as of 1992 is less bad than one might have
expected of countries that did not have a pre-socialist history of a developed civil and commercial
law. This is primarily the result of the late perestroika reforms, which introduced some basic rules
                                                
34 Ibid.
35 Compare also the indicators for economic reforms of the EBDR in EBRD (1998) n. 22.
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on the organisation of enterprises, including shareholder protection rules.36 By 1998, the Eurasian
TEs had not only caught up with other transition economies, but their laws now offer better
protection on average than the laws of other transition economies. In contrast, creditor rights were
only very weakly protected in this region as of 1992 and in 1998 they continue to lag behind the
CEE/Baltics. The latter group of countries displays the least dramatic change between 1992 and
1998. Yet legal change during the transition period has improved the level of investor protection
above that of other German legal systems. The results suggest that overall the law on the books in
transition economies is converging towards the highest level legal rules irrespective of the pre-
socialist legal heritage.
Convergence of legal rules can have different causes. It may be the result of top down
harmonization, which in turn may be induced by international standardization of selected areas of
the law, the influence of a common pool of advisors, or the conscious selection by domestic
policy makers in the law receiving country of the best quality laws based on comparative
research. Alternatively, convergence of legal rules may be the result of a response to similar
problems, which call for similar solutions. For example, widespread violation of minority
shareholder rights may have triggered similar efforts to strengthen the protection of these rights
across the region.
There is strong evidence that much of the legal change in shareholder and creditor rights we can
observe in transition economies is the result of foreign technical assistance. Various countries have
                                                
36 Feldbrugge n. 25; Pistor, “Company Law and Corporate Governance in Russia,” The Rule of Law and Economic
Reform in Russia, ed. Sachs, and Pistor, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press  1997): 165-187. Gray, and Hendely,
“Developing Commercial Law in Transition Economies: Examples from Hungary and Russia,” The Rule of Law and
Economic Reform in Russia, ed. Sachs, and Pistor, (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press  1997): 139-164.
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offered extensive aid to transition economies for reforming their legal systems. The American aid
agency (USAID) has been particularly active in many countries of the former Soviet Union,
including Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Uzbekistan, and
Ukraine, but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and with regard to creditor rights, also in
Poland.37 Countries wishing to join the European Union (EU) are required to harmonize extensive
parts of their laws with European standards. This includes key areas of the law that affect
shareholder rights, as well as creditor rights. The recent corporate law amendments in the Czech
Republic, and Hungary, for example, can be attributed to an effort to comply with harmonization
requirements. To illustrate the supply-induced convergence, Table 2 reports the value for LLSVsh
and LLSVcr in 1998 for countries that received substantial aid by USAID for reforming their legal
system on the one hand, and those that have completed accession arrangements with the EU on
the other. We drop the Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia for the comparison, as the late
onset of reforms may be misleading.
Table 2: Supply-led Convergence of Legal Rules













Mean for TEs that received USAID 3.85 3.03
First tier EU accession countries
                                                
37 This information was given by Alexander Shapleigh of USAID. According to them , the results have not been
equally strong in all countries. Good results were achieved in shareholder rights reforms in Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Romania. For creditor rights, good results were reported for Kazakhstan, Kyrgryzstan, Latvia,
Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. Since this assessmen by definition is rather subject, in our analysis we include all
countries that have received USAID for legal reforms of shareholder and creditor rights.
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First tier EU accession countries 3.05 3.4
Sample Mean All TEs 3.13 3.23
Note: na = not appicable, meaning that for this areas of the law, there was no
substantial involvement of USAID.
Source: Author‘s compilation.
The most striking result is the high level of minority shareholder protection in the countries that
received aid from the United States. The average for the six countries listed in Table 2 is close to
the average of the common law family (see Table 1 above). The countries that belong to the first
tier of future EU accession countries offer lower levels of minority shareholder protection, but are
still well above the average of German or French civil law systems. The reason could be that
several EU guidelines that were used for reforming the corporate laws of prospective member
states are influenced by UK law and thus are leading to an influx of common law principles into
the core countries of the civil law systems.38 Differences in creditor protection are more difficult
to attribute to different donors than differences in shareholder rights, at least if we confine
ourselves to the few indicators constructed by La Porta et al..
The evidence of convergence of legal rules across the region notwithstanding, the basis for
comparison when using only LLSVsh and LLSVcr is rather limited. For a more comprehensive
assessment of the patterns of legal change in transition ecnomies, we therefore develop a more
extensive taxonomy of shareholder and creditor rights in the following two sections.
                                                
38 For a discussion of the effects of the takover guideline in Poland see Soltysinski, “Transfer of Legal Systems as
Seen by the "Import Countries": A View from Warsaw,” Systemtransformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa und ihre
Folgen für Banken, Börsen und Kreditsicherheiten, ed. Drobnig et al., (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck  1998): 69-82.
Compare this with the positive evaluation of the City takeover code for transition economies by Coffee, “The
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3. Taxonomy of shareholder rights
The indicators we used for a first test of the convergence and divergence hypotheses focus only
on particular aspects of the law. For shareholders (LLSVsh), minority shareholder rights are
coded, and for creditor rights (LLSVcr), the rights of creditors, in particular of secured creditors, in
bankruptcy. Neither corporate law statutes nor legal rules aimed at protecting creditors, however,
are necessarily limited to these functions, nor is there necessarily only one set of rules to achieve a
particular outcome. A broader analysis of the dynamics of legal change in transition economies
therefore requires the inclusion of variables that capture other goals of the law, or offer functional
substitutes.39 In this section we develop a taxonomy of shareholder rights, while the next section
is devoted to creditor rights. Although the inclusion of some variables was motivated by legal
developments in transition economies, in principle this taxonomy may also be used to analyse the
patterns of legal change in other countries in more detail.
For shareholder rights we create five cumulative indices in addition to LLSVsh: VOICE, EXIT,
ANTIMANAGE, ANTIBLOCK, and SMINTEGR. The corporate governance literature
commonly distinguishes between ”voice” and ”exit” as the two alternative strategies shareholders
may invoke to assert their control over company management.40 Voice refers to control through
                                                                                                                                                             
Lessons From Securities Market Failure: Privatization, Minority Protection, and Investor Confidence,” Draft,
September 1999  (1999).
39 In comparative law methodology, analyzing the function of legal rules rather than trying to find identical legal
rules in different systems has long been recognized. See Zweigert (1984) n. 22, who call this approach a functional
approach to comparative law. Critical, however, Frankenberg, “Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative
Law,” Harv. ILJ 26.2 (1985): 411-455. On the importance of functional substitutes in corporate governance and
securities market regulation, see Coffee (1999), n. 8.
40 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States,  (1970). Coffee,
“Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,” Colum. L Rev. 91 (1991): 1277-1368.
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voting rights, including hiring and dismissing managers, shareholder suits, and the like. Exit means
that shareholders may liquidate their holdings by selling their shares in case they are not satisfied
with the way a company is managed. Both mechanisms shall protect shareholders, but they
provide different avenues for that purpose and are secured by different legal rules. Most of the
LLSVsh indicators are legal rules that protect ”voice”. The fact that these variables appear to be
important determinants for stock market development, may seem puzzling. A naive application
of the voice vs. exit concepts to the law would suggest that for equity market development, exit
rules should be more important than voice rules. The strong correlation between minority voice
rights and capital market development,41 however, suggests that even though minority
shareholders may be passive and prefer exit, they are likely to acquire minority stakes only, if this
position gives them the potential to exert control through voice, despite the fact that (due to cost
considerations) voice may never be exercised. Yet, since LLSVsh does not include indicators for
shareholder exit rights, we cannot test, whether they indeed substitute for weak voice rights.
The VOICE index includes all of the LLSVsh variables, as well as other control variables, which
may, but do not have to, be specifically targeted at minority shareholders. In particular, VOICE
includes the right of minority shareholders to call an audit commission, a minimum quorum
requirements for a shareholder meeting to take binding decisions, supermajority requirement for
adopting decisions that affect the existence of the corporation in its current form (including
amendments to the charter, the liquidation of the company, or mergers and reorganizations), the
possibility to fire directors and managers at any time without cause, and the absence of provisions
that mandate employee or state representation on the board. The last provision may strenghten
                                                
41 La Porta et al. (1997) n. 3.
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the position of other stakeholders in the firm, but does this at the expense of shareholder control.
Finally, we have included a provision which reflects a special feature of many corporate statutes
in transition economies: the allocation of the right to hire and fire top management (chief
executives) of the company. In most developed markets economies today this right is vested with
the board of directors (supervisory board), which in turn is elected by the shareholder meeting.
This ”representative democracy” model is widely believed to be more effective in controlling
management than the ”direct democracy” model,42 in which shareholders themselves hold this key
control right. The reason is that shareholders may lack information to respond, and even if they
have access to adequate information, will be slow to act. Yet, several transition economies still
favor the ”direct democracy” model, although different arrangements in the corporate charter are
often optional.
The EXIT index includes legal rules that facilitate shareholders leaving the corporation. This
includes a legal provision that protects the right to sell shares without prior approval by other
shareholders or the company’s directors (without exceptions to this rule, i.e for bearer shares,
which are quite common in civil law countries); and the absence of extensive formal requirements
for selling one’s shares. EXIT also includes rules that facilitate exit by shareholders in case of
take-overs and other major transactions that may endanger their position in the company. In
particular we include put options and mandatory takeover rules. While the latter may prevent
takeovers (which in the context of transition economies may in fact be desireable), the protection
of minority shareholders still is an important objective.
                                                
42 Black, and Kraakman, “A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,” HLR 109 (1996): 1911-1982.
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With ANTIMANAGE and ANTIBLOCK we try to asses the relative weight given by a legal
system to the conflict between shareholders and management on the one hand, and minority
shareholders and blockholders on the other. Comparative corporate governance analysis has
shown that the conflict that is widely assumed to be at the heart of the governance problem, the
principal-agent conflict between shareholders and managers, is not the relevant conflict in many
countries.43 Firms with highly concentrated ownership typically have a shareholder whose stake
is large enough to effectively control management. The strong position of a blockholder may,
however, endanger the position of minority shareholders. ANTIMANAGE includes legal rules
aimed at protecting shareholders against management, and ANTIBLOCK rules designed to protect
minority shareholders against blockholders. The relevance of either set of rule will be determined
by the ownership structure of firms. In firms with high concentration of ownership, minority
shareholders will require effective ANTIBLOCK provisions. By contrast, in firms with dispersed
shareholdings, ANTIMANAGE provisions are warranted.
ANTIMANAGE is not identical with LLSVsh discussed above. In the oppressed minority
variable, for example, LLSVsh lumps together the right of shareholders to sue directors with the
right to challenge in court decisions that were taken at the general shareholder meeting.
Management is the target of the first right, while other shareholders, in particular, controlling
ones, of the latter. We therefore split this variable into two separate ones and use the right to sue
management for ANITMANAGE, and the right to challenge decisions of the shareholdermeeting
for ANTIBLOCK. ANTIMANAGE also includes self-dealing rules, which require management
                                                
43 Berglöf (1995) n. 19, Berglöf, and von Thadden, “The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications
for Transition and Developing Countries,” Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics,
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank  1999). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership
Around the World,” J Fin LIV.2 (1999): 471-517.
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to abstain from or disclose transactions that compromise their loyalty to the firm, while
ANTIBLOCK combines some of the voice and exit variables that protect minority shareholders
especially against controlling shareholders, including quorum requirements, and put options.
Finally, we create a stock market integrity index (SMINTEGR), which codes rules the primary
purpose of which is not the protection of individual shareholder rights, but of the integrity of the
capital market. This is a classic example for a functional substitute. The ultimate goal of individual
shareholder rights is to effectively control the use of capital by the firm, which should influence
the market value of shares and thus their liquidity on the market. However, market liquidty could
be equally well, or in some circumstances even better protected with rules that are designed to
protect the functioning of the market and enforced by the state.44 We use self-dealing, insider
trading rules, provisions on the independence of a shareholder registry, and regulations on the
supervision of the stock market by a state agency to capture this function.45 Appendix 1 includes
the definitions of the variables used to construct the various indices and explaines how they were
coded. Appendix 2 reports the level of shareholder protection for these six indices for all 24 TEs
from 1992 through 1998. Table 3 below gives the mean score as well as the percentag of each
index for all TEs and for the three legal families.
                                                
44 Coffee (1999), n. 39.
45 Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain reliable data on changes in disclosure requirements for all countries.
Most laws have provision mandating the annual disclosure of company information to their shareholders. We did not
include this variable, because of the lack of variance, and because it does not reflect the extent of disclosure
requirements for publicly traded companies.
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Table 3: Shareholder rights 1992 and 1998
All 24 TEs CEE/Baltics SEE Eurasia
Indicators 1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 1998
LLSVsh (0-6)
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Source: Data base compiled by Author.
The data in column 1 clearly demonstrate the extent of legal reforms since 1992. The average score
increased substantially across all indices. Change was particularly great for SMINTEGR and
ANTIMANAGE. Interestingly, the focus of corporate law reform as captured by our shareholder
indices has not changed over time, at least not for transition economies taken as a group.
Shareholder rights that are reflected in the VOICE index were and still are the most developed
rights. As noted above, VOICE reflects internal control rights of shareholders, including, but not
limited to, minority shareholders. Second in importance is ANTIMANAGE, i.e. those legal
provisions that are specifically targeted at management. This reflects the classic corporate
governance paradigm with its focus on the conflict between shareholders as principals and
management as their agent. Third in order is LLSVsh, i.e. the protection of minority shareholder
rights. EXIT, that is legal rules that protect the right to sell shares and give shareholders in
exceptional situations the right to redeem their investments, is fourth and thus ranks before
ANTIBLOCK. The latter index, which captures legal rules that protect minority shareholders
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against blockholders rather than management are only relatively weakly developed. Finally, last in
order are legal rules that ensure the integrity of the capital market, as captured by SMINTEGR.
For 1992 the weakness of SMINTEGR is not surprising. After all, only few stock exchanges had
been established already (Warsaw, and Budapest) and many transition economies lacked pre-war
experiences with stock exchanges. More interesting is that SMINTEGR still ranks lowest on
average in 1998. Whether or not state regulations of securities markets are desirable, is highly
disputed in developed market economies.46 In transition economies and emerging markets, the
situation may, however, be quite different. Many of the assumptions on which the quest for
deregulation rests in developed market economies, such as transparent information, market
intermediaries with superior knowledge of the market that may signal investors‘ choice, etc., do
not hold in these environments. Case studies of the experience of different transition economie
suggest that more stringent regulation of these markets positively correlates with better market
developmepnt.47 Moreover, given that courts in the region lack expertise in dealing with
shareholder rights, reliance on internal control mechanisms alone may not be sufficient.
                                                
46 Stigler, “Public Regulation of the Securities Markets,” Journal of Business XXVII.2 (1964): 117-142. Jarrell,
“The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues,” J L&Econ XXIV.December
(1981): 613-675. Coffee, “Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System,” Virg. L Rev.
70 (1984): 717-753. Seligman, “The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,” J Corp L 9.1
(1983): 1-61. Hopt, and Baum, “Börsenrechtsreform in Deutschland,” Börsenreform - Eine ökonomische,
rechtsvergleichende und rechtspolitische Untersuchung, ed. Hopt, Rudolph, and Baum, (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel
Verlag  1997): 287-467. The debate is now taking a new turn, where the importance of (some) regulation is
acknowledged in principle, but the need for federal vs. state (or decentral) regulation debated. See Romano,
“Empowering Investors: A market Approach to Securities Regulation,” The Yale Law Journal 107 (1998): 2359-
2430.
47Pistor, “Law as a Determinant for Stockmarket Development in Eastern Europe,” The Value of Law in Transition
Economies, ed. Murrell, (Washington, D.C.:  1999): (forthcoming).; Coffee (1999) n. 44. For experiences in other
parts of the world see also Rosen, “The Myth of Self-Regulation or the Dangers of Securities Regulation Without
Administration: The Indian Experience,” J Comp Corp L & Sec Reg 2 (1979): 261-302. as well as Pistor, and
Wellons, The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic Development,  (Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press 1999). (chapter 6).
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The breakdown of transition economies into those with different legal histories does not
fundamentally alter the picture presented above. For the Eurasian group, the order is virtually the
same with the exception that in 1998 ANTIMANAGE ranks before LLSVsh. A closer look at the
transition economies with German and French legacies gives a more nuanced picture. In the
countries with German legal influence, ANTIMANAGE takes the lead in 1998 and pushes
VOICE to the second, LLSVsh to the third place. This suggests that legal reforms have been
primarily aimed at strengthening shareholder rights vis-à-vis management. More importantly,
SMINTEGR takes the fourth place in this group, and thus ranks higher than in the other two legal
families. To be sure, the reform of securities legislation has been quite uneven in these countries.
While Poland and Hungary, for example, established an independent securities and exchange
commission at the outset of reforms, the Czech Repbulic followed suit only in 1998.48 Yet, by
1998, most of these countries had established an SEC, although insider trading and self-dealing
rules are still uneven. Finally, ANTIBLOCK in these countries is more important than are EXIT
rules. The weak performance of EXIT can in part be attributed to the fact that many countries
with German legal heritage include rules that allow the issuance of bearer as well as registered
shared and permit corporate statutes to restrict the right to sell bearer shares. Our definition of
free exit, which does not permit such exemptions, lowers the EXIT score for these countries.
For the countries with French legal heritage, the strong emphasis on ANTIMANAGE is visible
already in 1992 and is retained through 1998. But ANTIBLOCK also received more attention
than in other transition economies. By contrast, EXIT is only weakly developed (for similar
                                                
48 Pistor (1999) n. 47.
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reasons as the German TEs). Finally, SMINTEGR has been improved substantially by 1998, but
still lags behind the German family scores.
Comparing the level of protection for each index across the three families, the most surprising
result is the strong performance of the Eurasian countries, not only in 1998, but also in 1992. In
1992 they rank first on three indices (LLSVsh, VOICE, and EXIT), in 1998 on five of six,
excluding only SMINTEGR. The countries of French origin take the lead in two indices in 1992
(ANTIMANAGE and ANTIBLOCK), but perform worst than the German TEs on VOICE and
EXIT, and on SMINTEGR also worst than the Eurasion TEs. The fact that these countries do
not have any top ranking in 1998 is most likely the result of the slower pace of reforms in
Southeastern Europe for the reasons noted above. The strong performance of the Eurasian
countries in 1998 appears to be primarily the result of the strong US influence in reforming the
corporate laws in these countries. This is apparent especially in the elaborate provisions on
judicial recourse for shareholders (included in LSLVsh, VOICE, ANTIMANAGE, and
ANTIBLOCK). However, some provisions go beyond legal protections that are common in the
United States. An example is the (mandatory) requirement to transfer the adminsitration of the
shareholder register to an independent agency (an indicator included in EXIT).49 This provision
was included in several Eurasian countries in response to the misuse of control over shareholder
registers by company insiders.50 Similar provisions do not exist in other transition economies,
where this was less of a problem. Thus, more stringent regulation does not necessarily imply a
generally superior law, but may simply reflect a response to problems not known elsewhere. This
also suggests that existing problems are not simply a response to weak regulation, or could be
                                                
49 This requirement typically does not apply to all joint stock companies, but only those which exceed the stipulated
number of shareholders, i.e. 500 in the case of Russia and Kazakhstan.
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easily solved through regulatory intervention. The said provision, for example, has remained
rather ineffective. Although rules with identical contents were introduced in Russian privatization
regulations, only a fraction of Russian companies implemented them. Moreover, the independence
of the depositaries was often doubtful, and contrl over the depositary by company management
has provide to be an easy vehicle for circumventing those rules.51
With respect to other provisions, it may be said the countries with a German legal tradition in fact
have inferior rules. Most of these countries, for example, include provisions that allow company
statutes to restrict the sale of bearer shares. Similarly, quorum requirements and supermajority
requirements for major transactions, which are captured by VOICE and ANTIBLOCK, are also
weakly developed in several of these countries. Note, for example, that in the Czech Republic, the
presence of 30 percent of shares suffices for a shareholder meeting to take binding decisions, while
in most other countries the quorum requirement is 50 percent.52
The more analysis of patterns of legal change using six shareholder indices that capture different
functions and mechanisms to improve the governance of firms, refines rather than refutes our
earlier finding that formal legal change in transition economies is converging irrespective of
presocialist legal heritage. As Table 3 shows, all three legal families have implemented
comprehensive legal reforms across the board. The refined analysis has, however, shown that
different legal families display similar priorities in the focus of legal change. Still, the improvement
of the internal control structure, including minority and antimanagement rights, has been foremost
                                                                                                                                                             
50 Pistor (1997) n. 36.
51 Pistor (1997) n. 36.
52 In fact, in the early period many of the former Soviet Union republics required 60 percent. This may, however, be
counter productive, because it decreases the likelihood for a shareholder meeting to reach the quorum.
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on the agenda in all countries. By contrast, antiblockholder and exit rights, as well as rules aimed
at ensuring the integrity of the securities market were also improved, but in 1998 still rank behind
our indices which capture primarily internal control rights. Several reaons may account for this.
First, the classic conflict between shareholders and management rather than between minority
shareholders and blockholders was used as the paradigm for reforming corporate law in transition
economies. Second, outside advice came primarily from two sources, the United States and
Europe, i.e. legal systems which recently are displaying increasing signs of convergence or at least
functional substitution.53 Third, the lack of attention that was paid to securities market regulation
can be attributed to a combination of ideolgical bias against regulation – as it clearly has been the
case in the Czech Republic – , and domestic political obstacles. An example for the latter is
Russia, where conflicts between the new securities and exchange commission, and the central bank
as well as the ministry of finance prevented the strengthening of this institution and the regualtory
framework for its operation .
4. Taxonomy of Creditor Rights
For creditor rights, we construct three cumulative indices in addition to LLSVcr, which we call
CREDCON, REMEDY and COLLAT. CREDCON captures the extent to which creditors can
control the bankruptcy process. It modifies LLSVcr to account for the difficulties in adapting the
first variable to local circumstances, and also includes additional control variables. Recall that
LLSVcr includes a variable called restriction on reorganization. This variable reflects concerns
about the US bankruptcy code. Under this law, a debtor who files for bankruptcy has the option
                                                
53 Berglöf, “Reforming Corporate Governance: Redirecting the European Agenda,” Economic Policy .24 (1997): 93-
119.; Coffee (1999) n. 8.
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to file under chapter 11 (reorganization) or chapter 7 (liquidation). No creditor consent or court
review is required for either decision. This implies that even though the winding up of the
company may be the economically most efficient outcome, a protracted reorganization procedure
can first be initiated, and only after that fails may a firm be forced into liquidation procedures.54
The problem with this variable is that in many countries outside the US the law does not know a
clear separation between reorganization and liquidation procedures. Instead it may offer only a
liquidation procedure, or establish a unified bankruptcy procedure during the course of which
liquidation as well as reorganization are options that might be considered. In these countries, the
problem La Porta et al. (1998) want to address does not exist, or is less severe. CREDCON
therfore excludes this variable, but employs the other three variables of LLSVcr and adds two
more variables: automatic trigger to go into bankruptcy, and creditor consent for adopting a
liquidation or reorganisation plan. An automatic trigger is a provision that mandates a debtor to
file for bankruptcy, in case legally specified conditions have occurred. Several transition
economies have experimented with automatic triggers. Hungary came to fame, when it introduced
a provision in 1992 mandating companies to file for bankrutpcy, in case they were unable to meet
their payment obligations for more than three months. This resulted in a flood of bankruptcy
cases.55 Since courts were unable do deal with these numbers, the legislature was forced to
backtrack and relaxed the provision in 1997.
Coding an automatic trigger is somewhat tricky. Most countries use rather forceful language
(shalt, must) indicating that a debtor who is insolvent is obligated to file for bankruptcy.
                                                
54 On the pros and cons of the US bankrutpcy code see Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy,  (New York: Westbury
1993): 283.
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However, the conditions that trigger bankruptcy, in particular the definition of insolvency, often
remain ambiguous. Our coding requires that the law specifies a time period of illiquidity along the
lines of the Hungarian example. The last variable captures, whether creditor consent is required for
adopting a reorganisation or liquidation plan. Since most countries in our sample have unified
bankrutpcy, or include only liqudiation procedures, creditor consent at this later stage appears to
be more relevant than when bankruptcy is initiated.
The relevance of LLSVcr as well as CREDCON depends on the existence and scope of collateral
rules in a legal system. The two indices assume that creditors can secure their claims and that
information about security interests is readily available. This is not necessarily the case. To
capture the existence of legal provisions on security interests, we included the index COLLAT. It
does not capture the entire range of possible security interests,56 but focuses on securing tangible
assets, including moveable assets (personal property) and immovable assets (real estate). First,
we code, whether or not land can be used as a collateral. The privatization of land is still a
contentious issue in many transition economies.57 Where land cannot be freely transferred, its
economic value as a collateral is also in question. The appropriate coding of land as a collateral has
proved to be difficult, because many countries have enacted legal provisions for mortgaing land,
but restrict the enforcement of these rights directly or indirectly. It was not possible to include
appropriate variables capturing legal restrictions on the use of land as a collateral, wherefore our
index may overstate the extent to which land is actually available and used to secure credits.
Second, we code the legal framework for security interests in movable assets. As is well known,
                                                                                                                                                             
55 Gray (1997) n. 36.
56 Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees,  Law and Practice of International Finance (London:
Sweet and Maxwell 1995).
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civil law jurisdictions for the most part require that a movable asset must be transferred to the
creditor in order to establish a legally valid security interest. This is not only cumbersome, but
deprives the debtor of the possibility to use the asset for productive use and to enable her to
repay the credit. Legal practice in many civil law countries has found ways to circumvent these
rigid rules. An example is Germany, where the transfer of full ownership with the contractual
obligation to retransfer ownership after the credit has been repaid has become a substitute for
collateral. Obviously, this practice lacks precisely the publicity and transparency which gave rise
to the legal rule in the first place that secured assets should be transferred to the creditor. Most of
the former socialist countries followed the civil law model and required transfer of the asset for
establishing a legally valid security interest.58 Some countries relaxed this provision early on in the
reform process, without, however, creating an alternative for publicity and transparency. The
1992 Russian law on pledge, for example, requires that the debtor keeps a book of the secured
interests in his assets.59
The EBRD developed a model law for secured transactions with the purpose of improving the
legal framework for security interests in transition economies, in particular the possibility to use
movable assets as a security.60 Numerous transition economies have used this law to  reform their
civil codes or related statutes, even though they may not have copied all of the provisions of the
model law.61 Others, Poland in particular, used US law (Section 11 of the Uniform Commercial
                                                                                                                                                             
57 Oda, “Law on Secured Transaction in Russia,” The Russian Civil Code, ed. Simons, (Leiden: Kluyver
forthcoming1999).
58 Pistor, “Law Meets the Market: Matches and Mismatches in Transition Economies,” The World Bank 1995.
Summers, “Recent Secured Transaction Law Reform in the Newly Independent States and Central and Eastern
Europe,” Rev CEEL 23.3/4 (1997): 177-203.
59 For a detailed analysis of Russian law on security interests see Oda (1999) n. 57.
60 EBRD, Model Law on Secured Transactions, London (1994).
61 According to information obtained from the EBRD, the following countries have established registers for security
interests which used the EBRD model law or US law: Azerbiajan (1998); Belarus (1999); Bulgaria (1996); Estaonia
(1996); FYR Macedonia (1998); Georgia (1997); Hungary (1997); Kazakhstan (1998); Kyrgyzstan (1997); Latvia
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Code) rather than the EBRD model law.62 The key element of this reform effort was to establish a
registry for security interests in movable assets. Our index COLLAT captures, whether security
interests can be created without transferring assets to the creditor, and whether a law that
regulates the establishment and functioning of a register has been enacted.
Finally, we include an index called REMEDY. The position of creditors can be strengthened by
creating a legal framework that allows them to secure their loans and to enforce their rights in an
insolvency procedure. These rules, which are captured in the CREDCON and COLLAT indices,
give creditor ex ante control rights, which they can enforce in a bankruptcy procedure.
Alternatively, or as a supplement to these rules, the law may allow creditors to impose sanctions
on management ex post, which go beyond their original contractual rights or claims based on
security interests. For instance, creditors may hold management liable for violating bankruptcy
rules, or they may challenge the validity of transactions between the debtor and other parties that
were carried out in the time immediately preceding bankruptcy. REMEDY addresses these ex
post sanctions. For liability we require that creditors can invoke civil liability. Criminal sanctions
in extreme cases only, are not sufficient. As far as invalidating transactions that precede
bankruptcy is concerned, legal systems differ in the type of transactions that may be invalidated
and the time period prior to bankrutpcy that is defined as sufficiently sensitive to permit an
invalidation claim. To keep matters simple, we only code for the time period and ignore the type
of transaction. In particular we note, whether transactions that were carried out three months, 6
months, 1 year, or more than one year before bankruptcy was filed, can be invalidated.
                                                                                                                                                             
(1999); Lighuania (1998); Moldova (1996 - simplified version now under revision); Poland (1998); Romania (1999);
Ukraine (1997/99); Uzebkistan (1998). The enactment of these laws, however, is only the first step. Functioning
registries for security interests in movables apparently exist as of now only in Bulgaria, Hungarz, Latvia, Lithuania,
with some reservations in Poland, and apparently since March 1999 in Ukraine.
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Managers may not be the only targets of ex post creditor sanctions. REMEDY therefore also
includes a variable that asks whether creditors have recourse also against shareholders of the
corporation. In principle, shareholders of a company with limited liability are not liable for the
debt the company occurred. Yet several countries have developed doctrines that allow creditors in
exceptional cases to ”pierce the corporate veil”. In most countries, this right is limited to extreme
cases where shareholders purposely misuse creditor rights. However, some countries have
codified piercing the corporate veil provisions in parent-subsidiary relations.63 Including this
variable in our REMEDY index was motivated by a provision in the Russian civil code, which
stipulates that a parent company that controls the actions of its subsidiary may be held liable for
the obligations of that subsisiary. The drafters of the 1996 joint stock company law sought to
limit the extent to which this provision extends the liability of the parent company by including a
provision which requires an explicit contract or a stipulation in the statutes of the subsidiary
regarding the parent company's control rights.64 It is still an open question, how Russian courts
will interpret the two rules.
Appendix 3 gives the scores for each country from 1992 through 1998 on the four creditor rights
indices. Table 4 below reports the mean and percentage changes in 1992 and 1998 for all countries
included in the sample, as well as for the breakdown by legal family. Illustrations are found in
Figures 6 through 8.
                                                                                                                                                             
62 Summers (1997) n. 58.
63 An example is the German law on concerns. Art. 317 of the German corporate law (AktG), for example, states that
a company which controls another one without  having concluded a control contract, may be held liable for damages
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Table 4: Creditor rights 1992 and 1998
All 24 Tes TEs of German
origin
TEs of French origin Eurasian TEs
Indicators 1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 1998
LLSVcr (0-4)
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Source: Compilation by author from data base of creditor rights. See Appendices 2 and 3 for details.
According to these data, creditor rights were improved substantially in transition economies since
the inception of economic reforms. As with shareholer rights, the ranking of the four indices does
not change over time for the entire sample. LLSVcr comes first, followed by CREDCON, then
COLLAT, and finally REMEDY. However, there are a number of regional variations. In the TEs
of German legal heritage, REMEDY is better developed in 1992 than COLLAT. In these
countries, bankruptcy codes with some ex post creditor controls were in place at that time
already, however, the law on secured transactions, in particular for securing movable assets, was
only weakly developed. Obviously, the absence of a well developed collateral regime renders
provisions in bankruptcy codes that deal with the rights of secured creditors, ineffective. This
demonstrates that for an adequate assessment of the quality of the law, limiting creditor rights, for
example, only to rights of creditors in bankruptcy without analyzing the conditions for
establishing these rights, gives a distorted picture. In comparison to the CEE, the SEE took longer
                                                                                                                                                             
incurred by that company or its shareholders, if it made that company conclude detrimental transactions without
compensation.
64 Compare Art. 106 of the Russian Civil Code with Art. 6 Section 3 of the Law on Joint Stock Companies.
34
to put bankruptcy codes in place.65 For the Eurasian countries, the most dramatic change has been
the development of a collateral law. In 1998 it ranks first of the four indices. REMEDY also
changed substantially, but still ranks behind LLSVcr and CREDCON.
Looking at the level of creditor rights across regions, the most notable fact is that countries with
German legal heritage offered substantially better creditor protection as of 1992 than all other
transition economies on the four credetor irghts indices. By 1998, Eurasian countries have taken
the lead in COLLAT and REMEDY. Indeed, for the latter, the CEEs rank only third in 1998
despite the fact that they also show improvements in this index since 1992. A possible
explanation is that the Eurasian and SEEs compensated the initially weak protection of ex ante
creditor rights with very strong ex post rights in response to the problems creditors experienced
when trying to enforce their claims.
As far as COLLAT is concerned, the Eurasian countries have not only caught up with, put have
superseded the CEEs in reforming the legal framework for security interests in movables.
However, many of the registers that have been established recently are not yet in operation.66 The
high ranking of the Eurasian countries also disguises the fact that land is often not usable for
securing loans, because of continuing legal uncertainties about the eviction of present users of the
land and subsequent sales.67 As noted above, legal provisions that in principle permit using land
for mortgages (hypothek) therefore overstate the relevance of these laws for commercial practice.
                                                
65 Note: since we do not code for Yugoslav law in the former Yugoslav republics, our coding is likely to overstate
the absence of law in this region.
66 See Footnote 16 above.
67 Oda (1999) n. 57.
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The analysis of changes in different type of creditor rights does not fundamentally challenge our
earlier convergence proposition, but sheds light on the dynamics of change. Most importantly, the
patterns that are emerging suggest that legal change happened not at the outset of reforms, but
that the law was amended in response to apparent problems. In other words, it was primarily
reactive rather than proactive. In fact, there is evidence that countries shopped around for finding
solutions for particular problems, even though they may be inconsistent with the initial choice of
a particular legal system as their model. An example is the rather broad piercing the corporate veil
provision found in Russia today. It was copied from continental European civil law systems,68
whereas the 1996 Russian corporate statute was largely modeled after US law. Interestingly, most
of the CEEs and SEEs have not included similar provisions in their corporate statutes. An
explanation, which would be consistent with the retroactive story, is that they have not (yet)
encountered similar problems of parent-subsidiary relations.
A second pattern we find is compensatory (or over-) protection in countries with initially weak
laws. The strong emphasis on ex post creditor protection in Eurasian and SEE TEs, in particular,
show that weak initial protection has led not only to a strengthening of overall creditor rights, but
in particular of ex post control rights (REMEDY). These rights, which allow creditors to
invalidate transactions that were carried out in the period preceding the opening of bankruptcy
procedure, and to increase the pool of debtors by holding shareholders (in particular parent
companies) liable for debt incurred by the company, may indeed increase the pool of assets
available for distribution. However, the extended liability of shareholders changes the relative
rights and obligations of shareholders vs. creditors in the corporation in favor of creditors. Unless
                                                
68 Note that they were firs included in the civil code, which borrowed heavily from the Dutch civil code.
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the enforcement of such provisions is limited to extreme cases that are typically captured by
piercing the corporate veil provisions,69 they may cause concern among equity investors about
the reliability of the limited liability provisions that are an essential part of corporate statutes.
Thus, differences in initial legal conditions may shape the path of subsequent law reforms. They
will take into account not only the initial weaknesses, but also respond to the problems that have
occurred in the meantime an which at least in part may be attributed to these weaknesses. This
may result in overreactions, which are understandable, but may have longer term implications for
the balance of rights of different stakeholders in the firm.
5. Corporate Governance by Design?
The above analysis of the development of shareholder and creditor rights in transition economies
shows that law makers have not been seriously constrained by the historical ties of their country
to a particular legal family. If history was not a major determinant of legal change, other factors
may be more relevant. In paricular, legal change may have been influenced by the choice between
alternative corporate governance models. The corporate governance literature typically
distinguishes two major corporate governance models, one based on equity finance and control
primarily by capital makrets, the other on debt finance and control by banks in the dual role of
shareholders and major creditors.70 The former is typically associated with the United States and
the United Kingdom, the latter with Germany and Japan.
                                                
69 Avilov, et al., “General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies,” OECD 1999. strongly advocate
that such provisions should be strictly limited to these cases.
70 Roe, “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,” Yale LJ 102 (1993):
1927-2003.; Berglöf (1995) n. 19; Aoki, “Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition
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At the beginning of the transition process there was a lively debate, which of these two models
would be most appropriate for transition economies. Given the state of the banking sector, many
cautioned against giving banks control rights over enterprises.71 Others warned against relying on
equity market control, in light of the underdeveloped state of stock markets in the region.72
The actual development of financial markets in transition economies in transition economies
diverge from both models. The overall trend seems to be towards a control model, i.e. relatively
concentrated ownership.73 However, control does not necessarily imply debt financing or control
by creditors rather than equity holders, as both equity and debt financing remains highly
underdeveloped, and many companies rely on retained earnings or capital investments by strategic
owners. As far as banks as potential agents of corporate governance is concerned, short term
rather than long term lending is still the norm,74 with only modest progress in expanding the
maturity of lending activities over time. With respect to the Czech Republic, some authors had
earlier asserted that firms controlled by voucher funds which in turn are controlled by banks
outperform other firms,75 suggesting that a bank based corporate governance model similar to the
German one may be emerging in this country. Meanwhile this has given way to a more sober
assessment, namely that the better performance of thse companies' shares reflects the fact that
investment funds controlled by major banks tend to loot less than funds not controlled by major
                                                                                                                                                             
Econmies,” Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies, ed. Aoki, and Kim, (Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank  1995): 3-32.
71 Rostowski, “The Banking System, Credit and the Real Sector in Transition Economies,” Banking Reform in
central Europe and the Former Soviet Union, ed. Rostowski, (Budapest: CEU Press  1995): 16-41. Dittus, and
Prowse, “Corporate Control in Central Europe and Russia: Should Banks Own Shares?,” Corporate Governance in
Central Europe and Russia, ed. Frydman, Gray, and Rapaczynski.  2 vols, (London, Budapest, New York: Central
European University Press  1996) 1: 20-67.
72 Corbett, and Mayer, “Financial Reform in Eastern Europe: Progress with the Wrong Model,” Oxf. Rev. Econ Pol
(1992).
73 Berglöf (1995) n. 19.
74 Buch, Creating Efficient Banking Systems,  Kieler Studien, ed. Sieber (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1996).; Baer,
1996 #25; EBRD, 1998 #623.
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banks.76 However, this does not imply that the banks or their funds finance or control these firms
effectively.
It may still be too early to expect the emergence of clearly distinguishable governance models in
the region. Still, our data on the patterns of change in shareholder and creditor rights may offer
some insight into the preferences of policy makers in different countries for either model. We
therefore compare the level of shareholder vs. creditor rights protection at the beginning of the
transition process and as of today, and analyze the scope of change in different regions. For this
analysis, we use the sum of all shareholder rights (SUMsh) and creditor rights (SUMcr) indicators
rather than the various indices we have constructed.77 As before, we use the percentage of the
total indices for comparison. Table 5 below reports the results.
Table 5: Shareholder vs. Creditor Rights
All 24 TEs German TEs French TEs Eurasian TEs
1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 1998
SUMsh
 Mean




































Source: Compilation by author using shareholder and creditor rights data base.
The data show that at the outset of reforms shareholder rights on average were better protected
than creditor rights. Legal reforms introduced since have not changed this ranking, although the
difference has declined from 14.42 to only 5.48 percentage points (column 1). In the CEEs,
                                                                                                                                                             
75 Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl, Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic,
International Symposium on Capital Markets and Enterprise Reform (Washington D.C.: World Bank 1996).
76 Coffee, “Inventing a Corporate Monitor for Transitional Economies: The Uncertain lessons from the Czech and
Polish Experiences,” Comparative Corporate Governance - The State of the Art and Emerging Research, ed. Hopt
et al., (Oxford: Clarendon Press  1998): 67-138.
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creditor rights are better protected in both time periods. In SEE, creditor rights were only weekly
protected at the outset of reforms, but in 1998 were better protected than were shareholder rights.
Finally in the countries of Eurasia, shareholder rights are better protected in both periods,
although the gap between shareholder and creditor rights protection has decreased substantially
between 1992 and 1998 from 27.4 to only 3.85 percentage points.
The clearest indication of a preference for one group of stakeholders over the other can be found
in transition economies of German origin. Given the relatively high level of creditor protection at
the outset of reform, this may be the result of path dependent legal development rather than an
independent policy choice at the time economic reforms were introduced. It is interesting to note
that the only countries, which according to the EBRD have ”experienced growth in both deposit
taking and lending to the private sector beyond that of nominal GDP” since 1993,78 namely
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, can all trace their
legal origin back to the German civil law family. This certainly requires further reserach.
Another indication for policy choices that may have determined a particular governance model is
the privatization strategy pursued in different countries. Mass privatization programs were
expected to lead to relatively dispersed shareholder ownership, i.e. to a governance model that
would rely heavily on market control rather than on control by blockholders.79 Following the logic
of La Porta et al., the success of this strategy was highly dependent on the existence of well
                                                                                                                                                             
77 Obviously, this can be only a rough estimate of the relative importance of shareholder and creditor rights, as the
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78 EBRD(1998) n. 74 at p.118.
79 Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, “Voucher Privatization,” Journal of Financial Economics 35 (1993): 249.
Frydman, and Rapaczynski, “Markets and Institutions in Large Scale Privatization: An Approach to Economic and
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defined minority shareholder rights. Absent effective legal protection of minority stakes, investors
holding small stakes were unlikely to hold on to their shares for long. The predictablel result was
the concentration of ownership in privatized firms. This suggests that only a combination of
privatization strategy and a compatible legal framework could have resulted in a more dispersed
ownership structure.
In order to analyse, whether those countries that chose mass privatization programs made
reasonable efforts to develop complementary protection for minority shareholders, Table 6
reports the scores of LLSVsh from 1992 through 1998 for all countries that used voucher
privatization as the primary privatization method according to the EBRD transition report.80 We
also indicate the beginning of privatization to see, whether improvements in minority shareholder
rights preceded or followed privatization.
Table 6: Mass Privatization and Minority Shareholder Protection
Country Beginning of Privatization LLSVsh92 LLSVsh94 LLSVsh96 LLSVsh98
Armenia 1994 2.5 2.5 5.5 5.5
Azerbaijan 1997 2.5 2 2 2
Czech Republic 1992 2 2 3 3
Georgia 1995 2.5 2.5 3 3
Kazakhstan 1994 2.5 2.5 2.25 5.25
Kyrgyzstan 1994 2.5 2.5 2.25 2.25
Latvia 1994 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Lithuania 1991 2.5 3.75 3.75 3.75
Moldova 1993 3 3 3 3.5
Russia 1992 2 2.5 5.5 5.5
Ukraine 1994 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Mean masspriv. TEs - 2.55 2.66 3.3 3.61
Mean other TEs - 1.85 2.23 2.67 2.71
Mean (24 TEs) - 2.17 2.43 2.95 3.13
Source: EBRD (1998) n 74 and compilation by author from shareholder and creditor rights data base.
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(1996) n. 57.
80 EBRD (1998) n 74.
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For the eleven countries that used vouchers a the primary privatization method, the mean of
LLSVsh is somewhat above the mean for the entire sample in all years since 1992, and
substantially higher than in countries that did not pursue mass privatization strategies. In fact, the
difference between the sample means has increased over time from .7 (1992) to .9 (1998). Yet,
even in countries that pursued mass privatization strategies, the level of minority shareholder
protection was quite low in 1992 when compared to the average of the common law family, which
is associated with relatively dispersed share ownership and liquid capital markets (see Table 1
above).81 Moreover, with respect to this index, improvements were made in most countries only
after mass privatization began, in several even only after it ended. In the Czech Republic, for
example, mass privatization ended in 1995, but the revision of the commercial code, which
improved the position of minority shareholders waited until 1996. Similarly, in Russia, mass
privatization ended in July 1994, but it took until 1996 for the new law on joint stock companies
to enter into force. This suggests that legal reform was to a significant degree response driven. The
fact that improvements in the level LLSVsh were less pronounced in countries that did not follow
mass privatization strategies lends further support to this proposition. Note that in those
countries that did not implement mass privatization programs the mean of LLSVsh in 1998 was
only slighly higher than in 1992. In other words, importance of effective minority shareholder
protection was realized to a much greater extent in countries that had pursued mass privatization
strategies than in countries that used either management-employee buy outs (MEBs) or direct
sales as the primary privatization method.
                                                
81 La Porta et al. (1997) n 3.
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This response pattern of law making is not uncommon. Much of the historic development of the
corporate law in Europe and the United States seems to follow this pattern.82 The differences
between these countries and transition ecnomies that experimented with mass privatization,
however, is that the latter attempted to implement a fundamental change in the ownerhsip
structure and governance of firms. The failure to provide effective minority shareholder protection
ex ante has seriously limited, if not undermined, this attempt.83 Perhaps the response pattern of
legal change suggests that a regime change of the scale attempted by some transition economies is
simply not feasible, precisely because policy and law makers tend to react to rather than proact
economic change. This would call for a more gradual policy approach which takes into account the
lagg-effect of legal and institutional response.
It remains an open question, whether the strengthening of minority shareholder rights ex post will
substantially alter the trend towards concentrated ownership which is prevalent in the region,
including in countries that used mass privatization programs. There are several reasons to be
                                                
82 Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law,  (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press
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little interest in the extent and effectiveness of the law at the outset of reform. In their attempt to explain the
extremely low valuation of Russian companies in privatization, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, do not even discuss
the possible role of the weak legal environment Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, “Privatizing Russia,” Brookings
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at pp. 181 with reference to Pistor, “Privatization and Corporate Governance in Russia: An Empirical Study,”
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cautious about this. First, the absence of effective minority shareholder protection has caused a
loss of confidence by many small investors, which will take time to recover. Second, securities
market protection remains weak in most transition economies. To the extent the emergence of
viable securities markets in the region is dependent on effective market oversight,84 improvements
in the level of minority shareholder protection alone will not be sufficient. As the data in Table 7
below reveal, improvements in the level of SMINTEGR also tended to respond to rather than
precede mass privatization. More importantly, the mean of the subsample of countries that
implemented mass privatization programs in 1992 was only marginally higher than of the
countries that pursued other privatization strategies, and was equal to or even lower than the
control group in the subsequent years.
Table 7: Mass Privatization and Securities Market Regulation
Country Start of Priv. SMINTEGR92 SMINTEGR94 SMINTEGR96 SMINTEGR98
Armenia 1994 0 3 5 5
Azerbaijan 1997 1 1 1 1
Czech Republic 1992 3 3 4 5
Georgia 1995 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 1994 1 1 5 6
Kyrgyzstan 1994 0 0 2 2
Latvia 1994 1 1 1 1
Lithuania 1991 2 1 1 1
Moldova 1993 1 2 2 4.75
Russia 1992 2 3 3 3
Ukraine 1994 1 1 1 1
Mean masspriv TEs - 1.09 1.45 2.27 2.27
Mean other TEs - 0.84 1.46 2.53 3
Mean (24 TEs) - .95 1.45 2.41 2.86
Source: EBRD (1998) n 74 and author‘s compilation.
Third, the environment in which companies operate may make dispersed, or non-control
ownership structures (NCS), unsustainable.85 Explaining the prevalence of concentrated
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Press  1995): 69-84..
84 Pistor (1999) n. 47.
85 Bebchuk (1999) n. 18.
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ownership structures around the world, which is documented in La Porta et al. (1999),86 Bebchuk
argues that in the presence of private benefits of control those holding control rights are unlikely
to relinquish them. Should NCS be established in such an environment, they are unlikely to be
sustained. Bebchuk suggests that the law may increase the level of private benefits by not
preventing self-dealing transations or insider trading. The weakness of legal rules precisely in this
area of the law displayed by transition economies that pursued mass privatization strategies (see
Table 6 above), can therefore help explain, why control structures (CS) have come to dominate in
these countries despite the theoretical bias of  mass privatization strategies for NCS. This may
have compounded other private benefits, including the desire by incumbent management and
employees to ensure the survival of and to retain their position in the firm.87
To conclude, there is little evidence in our data that countries chose particular legal rules with a
certain governance structure in mind. The initial level of shareholder and creditor rights protection
was the result of historical accident rather than clear policy choice. Subsequent change was made
primarily in response to emerging problems, the scope of which were determined by the choice of
economic reform strategies. Countries that experimented with radical economic reform without
having adequate legal protection in place (in particular SMINTEGR), were at greater risk to
experience strong negative reactions in the development of financial markets. This has given way
to legal reforms aimed at remedying the shortcomings. The new laws, however, typically came too
late to prevent certain market developments in response to the earlier weaknesses, including a
development towards concentrated ownership of firms and the formation of company groups, and
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the loss of confidence by small investors in the market. The pattern of reform, where economic
reforms (privatisation, price liberalisation etc.) typically preceded legal reforms, has meant that
incumbents who held de facto control rights had an advantage over new title holders with weak
rights to protect them. This has increased the private benefits of control for incumbents and
decreased the likelihood that they would voluntarily relinquish their control rights. Improvements
of the law typically came too late to further the intended reallocation of rights. Rather it secured
control rights gained by whatever methods and thus has undermined, rather than built, a broader
constituency for legal reform. The new laws are therefore likley to be less effective now than if
they had been enacted at the outset of reforms.
Countries that pursued less radical economic reforms, were often not slower in reforming their
legal systems. While they may have foregone the opportunity of radically altering the structure of
their economies, they also did not confront the negative externalities the more radical reformers
had to face in light of the weak institutional infrastructure. A proposition that follows from this
analysis is that countries that implemented economic reforms more gradually and tied them in
with legal and other institutional reforms have developed more effective institutions that those
that pursued a radical reform agenda.88
6. Conclusion
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Transition economies have introduced remarkable changes in the laws that govern shareholder and
creditor rights over the past years. Change has been more extensive in countries that exhibited
lower levels of protection at the outset of reforms. Pre-socialist legacies have not impeded or
shaped the scope of reforms to a significant degree. Most countries went beyond the average level
of legal protection found in legal families to which they once belonged. This suggests a strong
trend towards convergence of statutory law across transition economies.
Yet, there are notable differences in the pattern of legal change in different countries, suggesting
that a simple convergence story does not do justice to the complexity of legal change. In
particular, initial preferences for shareholder vs. creditor rights have not been levelled out
completely, as the still comparatively strong level of creditor protection in countries of German
legal heritage suggests. Policy choices mattered for the scope of legal reform in particular areas of
the law, such as minority shareholder protection. Countries that pursued mass privatisation
strategies improved this set of rules considerably more than did others. Curiously, however, they
neglected the related area of securities market regulation, where improvements lagged behind in
comparison to countries that relied on more conventional methods of privatisation. Weaknesses in
this area of the law can explain why the potential for a more dispersed ownership structure and
relatively liquid stock markets created by mass privatisation programs was not sustained post
privatisation.
The high level of statutory legal convergence is largely the result of an external supply of legal
solutions. We cannot quantify the influence of domestic vs. external forces in shaping legal reform.
However, the strong similarities between laws that were influenced by identifiable groups of
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foreign advisors (US vs. EU) suggests that the contents of legal rules that were enacted in
response to certain problems was strongly influenced by the group of advisors that dominated in
a given country. How these externally supplied rules has been received in the different countries,
whether they are followed, and enforced by domestic legal institutions are questions that cannot
be captured by a simple analysis of changes in the law on the books and require further analysis.89
These features of the past reform process influence not only the evolving legal system, but also
the emerging governance structure of firms. Weaknesses in the governance structure that are noted
today are often attributed to weaknesses in the law, which in turn leads to new proposals for
improving statutory law. The evidence of the quality of the law on the books, however, suggests
that this is at best a partial story. The level of shareholder and creditor rights protection in
transition economies today is higher than in many other countries. Other factors, including the
dynamic of the reform process and its impact on the development of effective institutions to
enforce the new law, need to be analysed more closely in order to understand the remarkable
difference in the governance of firms despite the trend towards convergence of the law on the
books.   
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Appendix 1: Coding of Shareholder and Creditor Rights Indices
Shareholder rights
Nr Indicator Value LLSVsh* SMINT VOICE EXIT ANITMG ANTIBL
1 Mandatory One-Share-One Vote Rule 1/0 X X
2 Proxy by mail (not sufficient:
authorization of ps)
1/0 X X
3a Shares NOT blocked before the
meeting
1/0 X X
3b NO registration cut-off date before the
meeting
1/0 X X
4a Cumulative voting for election of
members of board (supervisory board)
1/0 X X X
4b Other rules to ensure proportional
board representation
1/0 X X X
5a Shareholder may take judicial recourse
against decisions by executives,
(supervisory) board
1 = direct and/or derivative suit by individual
shareholder or minority group (not more than 10%)
0,5 if legal claim is limited to nullifying decisions
of the board and does not include liability of
management
0 if shareholders cannot sue or have to request
supervisory board to sue
X X X
5b Shareholders may take judicial
recourse against decisions taken by the
Shareholder Meeting
1 = judicial recourse provided
0 = no such provision
X X X
6 Current shareholders have a
preemptive right in case new shares
are issued by company
1 = preemptive right mandated by law, which may
be changed only by decision of shareholders
0 = no preemptive right, or only optional
X X X
7 Shareholders, representing not more





0 = more than 20% of shares required for calling
extraordinary shareholder meeting
X X X
8 Corporate statutes specify the amount
of dividends to be paid out to
shareholders
1 = proporation of profits set aside for paying
dividends
0 = no such provision
X
9 Executives (incl. General Directors)
are appointed/dismissed by the board
(supervisory board) rather than the
shareholder meeting
1
0,5 if board apoints, but general meeting dismisses
0 if shareholder meeting appoints and dismisses
X X
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10 Members of the
management/supervisory board may
be dismissed at any time without
cause
1 =  if law does not specify conditions for
dismissal
0 = if law requires specific cause (including
violation of contract)
X X
11 At least 50% of total voting shares
must be represented at a SHM for it to
take binding decisions
1 = 50% or more of total shares required for
quorum
0 = less than 50% required
X X
12 Audit commission may be called by
minority shareholder representing not
more than 10% of shares
1 = if 10% of shares required
0,5 = if  20% of shares required
0 = if  more than 20% required or not regulated
X X
13 Fundamental decions, including
charter changes, liquidation of
companies, sale of major assets,
require qualified majority (at least 3/4)
0,5 for charter changes and liquidation only
0,75 the above plus changes in charter capital,
and/or company reorganization (incl. mergers,
takeovers)
1 for the above and sale of major assets
X
14 Board (supervisory) board members
are elected by shareholders (no
mandatory representation of
employees or the public)
1/0 X
15 Right to Transfer shares is not
restricted by law and may not be
limited by charter
1 = if the right to freely transfer shares cannot be
restricted by statute
0 = if this right can be restricted, even only for
bearer shares
X
16 Formal requirements for the transfer of
shares are limited to endorsement
(bearer shars) and registration
(registered shares)
1 = no additional formal requirements
0 = notarial certification, documentation of
contracts etc. required for valid transfer
X
17 Minority shareholders have a put
option (may demand that their shares
are bought by the company at fair
value) in case they have voted against
major transactions, including mergers,
reorganization, sale of major assets,
charter changes etc.
1 = put option by law
0 = not regulated
X X
18 Mandatory take over bid (threhold) 1 for 25% or less
0,75 for >30%
0,5 for > 50%
X X
19 Conflict of interest rules, including
rules on disclosing conflict and
abstaining from voting are included in
the law
1 = transaction specific conflict of interest rules
0 = no such rules, even if some  competition rules
(i.e. members of the board may not serve on boards
of other firms) are included
X X
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20 Shareholder register must be
conducted by independent firm (NOT
the issuing company)
1 = mandatory rule for publicly traded companies,
including companies exceeding a legally specified
number of shareholders
0 = if register is administered by the company
X
21 Insider trading prohibited by law 1 = rules against insider trading exist
0 = no insider tradingi rules
X






0, 25 for more than 50%
0 if no mandatory disclosure
X X
23 A state agency conducts Capital
Market Supervision
1 = if the task of supervising the securities market
is assigned to a designated state agency
X
24 Capital Market Supervision is
formally independent
1 = if the agency is independent and neither part of
or directly subordinate to a government ministry
(i.e. ministry of finance)
X
Note: LLSVsh includes 7 separate indicators. We have decomposed some of their indicators into two separate ones. Note, for example, that indicators 4a and 4b as
well as 5a and 5b are each one indicator in their data base. To achieve comparable results with LLSV, they should therefore be computed as (4a + 4b)/2 and (5a +
5b)/2 respectively. With respect to indicators 3a and 3b, LLSV use only 3a. I have added 3b, because registration of shares prior to the shareholder meeting has
similar effects as blocking shares. Although trading remains possible in the first case, trading shares after the registration date will have not influence on voting at
the shareholder meeting. Again, the two indicators could be computed as (3a + 3b)/2. Indicators that were originally coded by La Porta et al., but were not included
in their cumulative index are in paranthesis.
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 Creditor rights
Indicators Value LLSVcr CREDCON COLLAT REMEDY
1 Restrictions for going into
reorganization (i.e. creditor consent)
1/0 X
2 NO automatic stay on secured assets 1/0 X X
3 Secured assets first 1 = first or after costs of bankruptcy procedure are met
0.75 =  second after costs and other creditor category
0.5 = third after costs and other two creditor
categories
0.25 = fourth after costs and other creditor categories
0 = priority not different from unsecured creditors
X X
4 Management does not stay (receiver) 1/0 X X
5 Legal reserve
minimum percentage of total shares
required to avoid voluntary
dissolution
0 for no restriction
0,5 for simple majority
1 for qualified majority
(X)
6 Automatic trigger to file bankruptcy
(i.e. if debtor unable to meet
obligations for more than 90 days)
1/0 X
7 The adoption of a reorganization or
liquidation plan requires creditor
consent
1/0 X
8 Establishing a Security Interest in
movable assets does NOT require
transfer of asset
1/0 X
9 Law requires establishment of
register for security interests in
movables
1/0 X
10 An (enforceable) security interest in
land may be established
1/0 X
11 Legal provision that allows creditors
to pierce the corporate veil
1/0 X
12 Management can be held liable for
violating provisions of insolvency
law
(lower threshold than criminal
activities required)
1/0 X
13 Transactions preceeding the opening
of bankruptcy procedures may be
declared null and void
0.25 = 3 months prior to bankruptcy
0.5 = 6 months prior to bankruptcy
0.75 = 1 year prior to bankruptcy
1 = more than 1 year
X
55
Note: La Porta et al. (198) code 1/0 and do not use the scaled coding proposed vor variable 3.
Appendix 2: Scores for Shareholder Rights Indices (1992-1998)
LLSVsh SMINTEGR
Country 1992 1994 1996 1998 1992 1994 1996 1998
Albania 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1
Armenia 2,5 2,5 5,5 5,5 0 3 5 5
Azerbaijan 2,5 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Belarus 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1 1 1 1
Bosnia 0 0 0,5 0,5 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 4 4 4 4 1 1 5 5
Croatia 0 2,5 2,5 2,5 0 1 6 6
Czech Rep 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 5
Estonia 2 2 3,75 3,75 0 2 4 4
FYR Macedonia 0 0 2,5 2,5 0 0 1 5
Georgia 2,5 2,5 3 3 0 0 0 0
Hungary 2,5 2,5 2,5 3 3 3 3 5
Kazakhstan 2,5 2,5 2,25 5,25 1 1 5 6
Kyrgyzstan 2,5 2,5 2,25 2,25 0 0 2 2
Latvia 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 1 1 1 1
Lithuania 2,5 3,75 3,75 3,75 2 1 1 1
Moldova 3 3 3 3,5 1 2 2 4,75
Poland 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Romania 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1
Russia 2 2,5 5,5 5,5 2 3 3 3
Slovak Rep 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 0 2 2 2
Slovenia 0 2,5 2,5 2,5 0 3 3 3
Ukraine 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 1 1 1 1
Uzbekistan 2,5 2,5 3,5 3,5 0 0 2 2
VOICE EXIT
1992 1994 1996 1998 1992 1994 1996 1998
Albania 7,75 7,75 7,75 7,75 1 1 1 1
Armenia 8 8 12 12 1 1 3 3
Azerbaijan 8 7,5 7,5 7,5 1 1 1 1
Belarus 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 1
Bosnia 0 0 3,5 3,5 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 10,75 10,75 10,75 10,75 0 0 2 2
Croatia 0 5,25 5,25 5,25 0 1 1 1
Czech Rep 3,5 3,5 4,5 4,5 1 1 2,5 2,5
Estonia 6,75 6,75 9,5 9,5 2 1 2 2
FYR Macedonia 0 0 5,75 5,75 0 0 0,5 0,5
Georgia 8 8 9 9 1 1 0 0
Hungary 6,25 6,25 6,25 6,75 1,5 1,5 1,5 0,5
Kazakhstan 8 8 7,25 12,5 1 1 3 3
Kyrgyzstan 7 7 9,25 9 1 1 2 2
Latvia 7,25 7,25 7,25 7,25 1 1 1 1
Lithuania 8,25 9,75 9,75 9,75 1 1 1 1
Moldova 7,75 7,75 7,75 9 2 2 2 4
Poland 6,25 6,25 6,25 6,25 3 3 3 3
Romania 5,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 1 1 1 1
Russia 6 7 12 12 3 3 3,75 3,75
Slovak Rep 4 4 4 4 0 1 1 1
Slovenia 0 6,25 6,25 7,25 0 3 3 3
Ukraine 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2
Uzbekistan 8 8,25 10 10 1 2 3 3
ANITMANAG ANITBLOCK
1992 1994 1996 1998 1992 1994 1996 1998
Albania 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3
Armenia 2,5 2,5 5 5 2 2 4,5 4,5
Azerbaijan 2,5 3 3 3 2 1 1 1
Belarus 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1 1 1 1
Bosnia 0 0 1,5 1,5 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 5
Croatia 0 4 4 4 0 2 3 3
Czech Rep 2 2 2 2 1 1 4,5 4,5
Estonia 2 2 4,5 4,5 1 1 4 4
FYR Macedonia 0 0 2,5 2,5 0 0 3,5 4,5
Georgia 2,5 2,5 4 4 2 2 2 2
Hungary 2 2 2 4 2,5 2,5 2,5 4,5
Kazakhstan 2,5 2,5 3,5 5,5 2 2 3 6,25
Kyrgyzstan 1,5 1,5 3,5 4 2 2 3 3
Latvia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lithuania 4 3,5 3,5 3,5 2,5 3,5 3,5 3,5
Moldova 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 6,25
Poland 3 3 3 3 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5
Romania 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Russia 3 3 5 5 2 2,5 6 6
Slovak Rep 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 0 3 3 4 0 3,75 3,75 3,75
Ukraine 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2 2 2 2
Uzbekistan 2,5 2,5 5 5 2 2 3,5 3,5
30.9.1999
Appendix 3: Scores for Creditor Rights Indices (1992-1998)
LLSVcr CREDCON
Country 1992 1994 1996 1998 1992 1994 1996 1998
Albania 0 0 3 3 0 3 3 3
Armenia 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4
Azerbaijan 0 3 3 4 0 4 4 3
Belarus 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
Bosnia 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4
Bulgaria 0 3 3 3 0 4 4 4
Croatia 0 0 4 4 0 0 5 5
Czech Rep 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Estonia 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
FYR Macedonia 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 2,75 2,75 0 0 2,75 2,75
Hungary 3,75 3,75 3,75 3,75 4,75 4,75 4,75 3,75
Kazakhstan 1,5 1,5 1,5 2,75 1,5 1,5 1,5 2,75
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
Latvia 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5
Lithuania 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Moldova 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4
Poland 2,25 2,25 2,25 2,25 4,25 4,25 4,25 4,25
Romania 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 4
Russia 0 3 3 2,5 0 3 3 3,5
Slovak Rep 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5
Slovenia 0 4 4 4 0 5 5 5
Ukraine 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Uzbekistan 0 2,5 2,5 2,5 0 4,5 4,5 4,5
30.9.1999
COLLAT REMEDY
Country 1992 1994 1996 1998 1992 1994 1996 1998
Albania 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Armenia 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1
Azerbaijan 0 0 1 3 0 0,5 0,5 1,75
Belarus 1 1 1 1 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
Bosnia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,75
Bulgaria 1 1 3 3 0 2 2 2
Croatia 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2
Czech Rep 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Estonia 0 3 3 3 1 1 1 1
FYR Macedonia 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 2 2 3 0 0 0 0
Hungary 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1
Kazakhstan 2 2 2 3 0 0 1 2,75
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 2,75
Latvia 0 0 0 1 0,75 0,75 0,75 1
Lithuania 1 1 1 3 0,75 0,75 0,75 0
Moldova 0 1 2 3 0 0 1 1
Poland 1 1 1 3 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5
Romania 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2
Russia 1 1 1 2 0 0,5 1,5 2,5
Slovak Rep 1 1 1 1 1,5 1,5 1,5 2
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 0 1,75 1,75 1,75
Ukraine 2 2 2 2 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 2 0 1,75 1,75 1,75
